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IMMIGRATION AND THE CRIME DROP: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES  
 
Dainis Ignatans (University of Huddersfield) and Roger Matthews,  
(University of Kent) 
Abstract 
Explanations of the remarkable decrease in crime over the last two decades 
across a number of western countries have been in varying degrees 
unpersuasive. The article presents an exploratory analysis of possible links 
between immigration into the UK and crime levels. Drawing on a range of 
international research the paper suggests that in contrast to the popular 
opinion that increased immigration is associated with an increase in crime, 
that not only are the recent waves of immigration not statistically linked to 
increased rates of crime in the UK and elsewhere, but that the proposition 
that recent waves of immigration may have contributed to the crime drop is 
tenable. Possible ways of clarifying the issue are suggested.  
Keywords: Immigration, crime, crime drop, violence, victimisation. 




The decrease in recorded crime and victimisation studies over the past two 
decades in the UK, North America and other Western countries is without 
doubt the most remarkable development in relation to crime in living 
memory. According to the International Crime Victims Survey (UNICRI 
2000; Farrell et al. 2010) crime has decreased over the last two decades in 
at least twelve different countries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, England 
and Wales, Finland, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, Scotland, 
Switzerland and the USA). In England and Wales the overall decrease in 
recorded crime in this period is in the region of thirty five per cent. 
Surprisingly,  there has been a paucity of informed commentary on this 
development. In fact, it was not until 2000, around half a decade after the 
crime drop became evident, that the first major publication appeared. This 
was an interesting but ultimately inconclusive collection of articles edited 
by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman (2000) that attempted to assess the 
significance of different determinants of changing levels of crime. 
The twin causes of the crime drop were widely held to be changes in 
policing and in imprisonment. Radical changes in styles of policing, 
particularly in New York, were held to have had a major impact. However, 
Andrew Karman (2000), in his review of the decline of crime in New York 
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City pointed out that recorded crime had also decreased significantly in 
other US cities that employed other forms of policing. Because the crime 
drop was common across cities with contrasting policing styles, the role of 
policing in reducing crime was cast into doubt. Similar limitations occurred 
in relation to imprisonment. Crime rates decreased in states where prison 
numbers were stable or decreasing as well as those where inmate numbers 
increased. These arguments were swiftly followed by a number of other 
competing claims, such as changes in drug use, the legalisation of abortion, 
new forms of gun control as well as changing levels of lead in petrol 
which, it was argued, were responsible to some degree for falling crime 
rates (Blumstein and Wallman 2000; Levitt 2005; Conklin 2009). While 
these different factors may individually have had some effect on the crime 
rate in some locations they all seem to fall short in terms of providing a 
comprehensive explanation of the international and persistent nature of the 
decrease in recorded crime (Farrell 2013). 
Significantly, there have only been five books focusing on the crime drop 
to date and they have all been published in the USA (Blumstein and 
Wallman 2000; Karman 2000; Conklin 2009; Parker 2008; Zimring 2007; 
2011). Despite the fact that the decrease in recorded crime in the UK has 
almost mirrored that, which has taken place in North America, there is no 
major British text to date that directly addresses this issue. 
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Not surprisingly, American books on the subject have concentrated on 
developments in the US paying relatively little attention to drops in crime 
elsewhere. Importantly, however, a crime drop, which is common across 
countries, demands a cross-national account. International comparisons 
make many of tKH OHDGLQJ µH[SODQDWLRQV¶ IRU WKH FULPH GURS HYHQ OHVV
tenable as changes in policing, imprisonment, drug use and the like show 
no clear or direct association with the crime drop in Western countries 
other than the USA. Consequently, those books which have sought to 
explain the crime drop are found wanting. Franklin Zimring (2003), for 
example, who although taking some account of international developments 
DGPLWV LQ KLV FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW µWKLV LV D ERRN ZLWKRXW D ERWWRP OLQH¶ DQG
argues that the discipline as a whole suffers from parochialism and 
µLGHRORJLFDO EOLQGHUV¶ ,Q D VLPLODU YHLQ $QGUHZ .DUPDQ  DIWHU
presenting a fairly exhaustive critique of the various accounts the crime 
drop is equally inconclusive, FODLPLQJ WKDW WKHUH ZDV D µIRUWXLWRXV
confOXHQFH¶RIIDFWRUVDQGWKDWQRVLQJOHIDFWRULVPRUHLPSRUWDQWWKDQWKH
rest. He does point out that the crime drop seems to have continued over 
the past two decades despite economic downturns and political 
fluctuations. The persistence of the drop in  crime over time he adds 
questions the liberal claim that crime is a direct product of deprivation, as 
well as the conservative claim that crime can effectively be reduced by get-
tough policies. 
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What arises from a review of the literature is that any plausible explanation 
of the crime drop has to account for four main developments. First, that 
crime has decreased steadily year on year. It has not been a process of 
fluctuations or of gains and losses, but a fairly consistent fall over time, 
albeit at different rates. Second, the drop is evident across crime types,  
including both violent and property crime. There are, of course, some 
variations in the changes in different countries and there are particular 
exceptions such as the increase in recorded rape cases in England and 
Wales, but the near ubiquity of the drop itself is remarkable. Third, crime 
has fallen across regions within countries as well as cross-nationally 
(Ogston 2013; Roberts 2014; Warrell 2014). Fourth, the crime drop has 
been an international phenomenon. Some twelve countries have reported 
significant decreases in recent years but the international nature of this 
development means that explanations have to move beyond the 
parochialism that pervades contemporary criminology.  
The implication of these four aspects of the crime drop is that we need to 
embrace wider socio-economic and cultural explanations if we are to 
achieve an understanding. Even James Q. Wilson (1983), who is probably 
best known for his arguments on the need to focus on minor crimes, 
incivilities and anti-social behaviour has recently suggested in an article in 
the Wall Street Journal that: 
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 At the deepest level, many of these shifts, taken together suggest 
that crime in the United States is falling ± even through the 
greatest economic downturn since the Great Depression ± because 
of a big improvement in the culture. The culture argument may 
strike some as vague, but writers have relied on it in the past to 
explain both the Great Depression fall in crime and the explosion 
of crime during the Sixties (Wilson 2011: 4). 
$OWKRXJK :LOVRQ QRWHV WKDW PHDVXULQJ DQG H[DPLQLQJ µFXOWXUH¶ UDLVHV
methodological difficulties he is no doubt correct that explanations based 
on broad socio-cultural forms of analysis offer the possibility of developing 
more plausible and credible explanations of the crime drop than many of 
those accounts that have been offered to date. 
Immigration, Crime and Violence in America 
Robert Sampson (2006; 2008) has also explored some of the cultural 
aspects of the crime drop. He has suggested that mass immigration may 
have played an important role in changing the cultural mix in inner city 
communities and may have served to µGLOXWH¶ the existing criminogenic 
culture in many American cities. This thesis at first appears counter 
intuitive and goes against the common sense wisdom that immigrants are 
disproportionately involved in crime. High levels of incarceration in 
different countries amongst various immigrant groups are often presented 
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as an indication of their high level of criminal involvement. These claims, 
along with frequent media depictions of immigrants participating in high 
profile crimes such as drug dealing, sex trafficking and the like, reinforces 
the popular conception that serious crime is largely perpetrated by 
outsiders, foreigners and immigrants. Migrants, according to the popular 
myth come predominantly from poor countries, have low levels of 
education and skills, and travel to countries like the UK to take advantage 
of a relatively generous welfare system, or to engage in illicit enterprises 
(Charteris-Black 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007; Zedner 2010). 
Sampson (2008) argues that this depiction of immigrants is largely 
mistaken and that the empirical evidence presents a very different picture. 
In essence, a number of studies have shown that in America and elsewhere 
first generation immigrants are generally law abiding and hard working. 
Self-report studies, for example, indicate that criminal involvement is 
generally lower amongst immigrant groups in America (Kubrin and 
Desmond 2009; Butcher and Piehl 1998). Moreover, immigrant groups 
tend to include the most confident, mobile, and energetic sections of the 
population in the countries from they come. 
In contrast to the claims of social disorganisation theory and the work of 
the Chicago School it is apparent that the influx of immigrants can often 
revitalise certain areas and that rather than adding to the disintegration of 
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the area into which they settle, they can become essential to the continuing 
vitality of the area by introducing and establishing new familial and 
neighbourhood institutions that can serve to improve the local economy 
(Sampson 2008; Kubrin 2012). Sampson also suggests that certain 
immigrant groups, particularly the Hispanics in America, have a lesser 
culture of violence than the indigenous population and therefore can have a 
depressing effect on the culture of urban violence. 
Drawing on his Chicago research, Sampson (2008) claims that there is a 
growing volume of evidence that points to increased immigration as a 
major factor associated with lower crime rates. He suggests that: 
 ,QWRGD\¶V society, I would hypothesize that immigration and the 
increasing cultural diversity that accompanies it generate the sort 
of conflicts of culture that lead not to increased crime but nearly 
the opposite. In other words, selective immigration in the current 
era may be leading to the greater visibility of competing non-
violent mores that affect not just immigrant communities but 
diffuse and concatenate through social interactions to tamp down 
violent conflict in general (Sampson 2008: 33). 
These themes have been explored and endorsed in the American context by 
other commentators. A study of violent crime employing a pooled cross 
sectional time series analysis by Jacob Stowell et al. (2009) concluded that 
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violent crime tended to decrease as Metropolitan areas experience gains in 
their concentration of immigrants. This inverse relationship was found to 
be especially robust in the case of robbery. 
Another study of violent crime in America by Tim Wadsworth (2010) also 
found that cities with the largest increases in immigration between 1990 
and 2000 experienced the largest decreases in homicide and robbery in this 
period. Wadsworth, like other researchers, has focused on violent crime 
and robbery mainly because the data on these offences are seen to 
relatively reliable and because violent crime tends to be a public and policy 
priority. Significantly, immigrant composition has been found to have a 
negative association with violent crime rates in Chicago (Velez 2009), Los 
Angeles (Fieldmeyer 2009) as well as Miami, El Paso and San Diego 
(Martinez et al. 2004).  
Graham Ousey and Chris Kubrin (2009) have explored the connection 
between immigration and crime rates in 159 US cities between 1980 and 
2000. Focusing on the macro-level of change they examined how 
immigration affects demographic, economic and social structures and how 
these changes in turn might affect crime rates. They found that on average 
that cities that experienced increases in immigration from 1980 to 2000 
H[SHULHQFHGDGHFUHDVH LQYLROHQWFULPHUDWHVDQGFRQFXUZLWK6DPSVRQ¶V
 FODLPV µWKDW LPPLJUDWLRQ PD\ EH D NH\ IDFWRU FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH
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FULPH GURS RI WKH V¶ 7KH\ FODLP WKDW WKLV RXWFRPH LV Painly a 
consequence of immigration having a depressing effect on crime by 
bolstering the family and local economies. This and related research has 
raised the question of criminal involvement amongst different generations 
of immigrants as well as the differential involvement in crime and 
victimisation amongst different ethnic groups (Hagan et al. 2008; Wortley 
2009). 
Immigration and Crime: The European Experience 
Research on immigration and crime in Europe has produced mixed results. 
(Tonry, 1997; Aebi and Linde 2010). Various studies have reported that 
those from ethnic minority groups in Western countries are 
disproportionately likely to be arrested and imprisoned for different crimes. 
(Albrecht 1999; van Kalmthout et al. 2007; Tonry 1997).  
Research on crime in Germany and Denmark has found that in Germany 
approximately one fifth of all crime suspects are immigrants (Entorf and 
Larsen 2010). However, it is reported that the proportion of non-German 
crime suspects has decreased from 26.7 per cent in 1993 to 19.3 per cent in 
2011. It is also pointed out that a substantial share of criminal cases in this 
period involved asylum seekers and that their offences were mainly to do 
with their under-status as non-Germans. 
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In Denmark, the evidence suggests that immigrants are generally over-
represented in the crime figures. However, their involvement in violations 
of the Penal Code has steadily decreased for males from 44.5 per cent in 
1995 to 38.09 per cent in 1998 and then to 34.7 per cent in 2000 (Entorf 
and Larsen 2004). The authors make a distinction between asylum seekers, 
illegal immigrants and foreign citizens with a residence permit. While 
asylum seekers were found to constitute a higher percentage of all 
convictions for violations of the Penal Code between 1997 and 2001 the 
percentage of foreign born citizens with a residents permit who were 
convicted in this period decreased from 12.2 per cent to 11.4 per cent. 
Cesar Alonso-Borrego and his colleagues (2012) have examined the 
situation in Spain between 1999 to 2009 and found that during this period 
there were large waves of immigration from various parts of the world. 
These authors suggest that while some immigrant groups have contributed 
to certain forms of crime, Latin American immigrants who were more 
easily assimilated into the culture have probably undermined the potential 
rise in crime rates in Spain. 
In a similar vein Tuba Bircan and Marc Hooghe (2011) differentiate 
between different immigrant groups settling in Belgium between 2001 and 
2006. Their focus is on the neighbourhood level and the differences in 
criminal involvement amongst different ethnic groups. By breaking down 
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immigrants into a number of sub-groups in relation to ethnicity the authors 
conclude that it is the unemployment rate amongst those different groups 
that most directly influenced crime levels. Although the authors note that 
both property and violent crime have decreased significantly in the period 
under study and that this was a period of high immigration into Belgium, it 
is claimed that it is unemployment and not the concentration of 
immigration in different neighbourhoods that is most prominently 
associated with the decrease in recorded crime.  
This research, however, is limited both conceptually and methodologically. 
Conceptually, the authors advocate a version of social disorganisation 
theory which would predict a rise in crime following waves in immigration 
involving different ethnic groups, leading to a weakening of community 
ties and the breakdown of informal controls. However, they note that there 
has been no discernible increase in either property crime or violent crime in 
neighbourhoods with high immigrant concentration. This observation 
would appear to further question the validity and explanatory value of 
social disorganisation theory in this context (Wortley 2009). Also, as the 
authors note themselves the data addresses a relatively short period and is 
unable to identify trends. Moreover, their investigation is reminiscent of 
the classic critiques of the unemployment and crime relation which pointed 
out that because this research does not examine the relevant populations at 
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the individual level it is never clear whether it is actually the unemployed 
in the selected areas who are committing crime (Box and Hale 1986). 
Interestingly, the immigration-crime nexus raises questions about the 
explanatory value not only of social disorganisation theory but also of 
other mainstream criminological theories including culture conflict, strain 
theory, labelling theory as well as rational choice and routine activities 
theory (Farrell 2013). Indeed, the most appropriate theoretical approach 
would seem to be some form of cultural criminology, but not so much in 
the form that focuses mainly on street culture, popular culture and the 
PHGLD EXW RQH WKDW HPEUDFHV D ZLGHU QRWLRQ RI µFXOWXUH¶ VHH 2¶%ULHQ
2005; Martinez and Lee 2000). 
Immigration and the Crime Drop in the UK 
There has been a noticeable reticence amongst British scholars to address 
the remarkable decrease in recorded crime that has taken place in the UK 
over the past two decades. Two of the main responses to the issue of the 
crime drop in the UK amongst British criminologists has either been to 
play down these developments and to claim that either the crime drop is a 
function of the manipulation of the crime figures by the key agencies, or 
that traditional forms of crime have been replaced by the growing volume 
of cybercrime (Fitzgerald 2014; Segal and Senna 2008). 
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In relation to the manipulation of the crime figures there is clear evidence 
that the police have changed recording practices in recent years and have 
DGPLWWHG µPDVVDJLQJ¶ WKH FULPH ILJXUHV ,Q 'HFHPEHU  WKH JROG
VWDQGDUG µQDWLRQDO VWDWLVWLFV¶ VWDWXV ZDV ZLWKGUDZQ IURP WKH SROLFH LQ
(QJODQG DQG :DOHV GXH WR GLVFRYHU\ WKDW WKH\ KDG EHHQ µILGGOLQJ¶ WKH
figures (Travis 2014). However, the continued and widespread decrease in 
a range of crimes over time, particularly those where the police are able to 
exercise limited discretion, or where there is not much room for 
manipulation such as car crime, robbery and serious violence, suggests that 
a significant decrease has taken place - at least amongst certain crime 
types. The international nature of the crime drop also suggests that despite 
dubious police recording practices in the UK, crime is decreasing in 
different countries where recording practices have remained relatively 
stable. In addition, the simultaneous decrease in victimisation recorded by 
the Crime Survey for England and Wales tends to reinforce the conception 
that crime rates are decreasing. 
In relation to the increase in new forms of cybercrime there can be little 
doubt that it is taking place, but it is extremely questionable that traditional 
IRUPVRIµVWUHHWFULPH¶DUHEHLQJGLVSODFHGLQWKLVZD\&\EHUFULPHZRXOG
in all probability increase in the current period irrespective of changes in 
other forms of crime. However, it is important to note that cybercrime 
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involves a distinctly different group of offenders than traditional forms of 
street crime as well as having a different set of victims (Wall 2007). 
There are two main studies, to date, on the crime drop in the UK. The first 
and probably the best known is by Graham Farrell and his colleagues 
 ZKLFK H[SORUHV WKH µVHFXULW\ K\SRWKHVLV¶ IRFXVLQJ PDLQO\ RQ
property crime and the role of crime prevention measures. Drawing on 
routine activities and opportunity theory the authors claim that changes in 
both the quantity and quality of security has been a key driver of the crime 
drop. Taking the widespread use of electronic immobilisers and central 
locking mechanisms for cars as their empirical reference point they claim 
that the subsequent reduction in car theft may have induced a decrease in 
other crimes including violence. There are however, questions concerning 
the fit between the introduction of these security measures and the decrease 
in vehicle crime in different countries as well as major doubts about the 
impact of car crime security on other forms of crime, particularly violent 
crime. 
Even Home Office researchers who are generally sympathetic to accounts 
based on routine activities theory and opportunity theory are sceptical 
DERXWWKHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHRIWKHµVHFXULW\K\SRWKHVLV¶DQGSRLQWRXWWKDW 
The hypothesis is largely silent on why violence has fallen alongside 
theft. And for acquisitive crime, the case that better security caused 
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the drop rests on the largely untested assumption that car immobilisers 
also prevented thieves from committing other types of theft. Data 
suggests that the opposite is equally likely ± that as one thing becomes 
harder to steal, thieves switch to something else. So, because all types 
of theft fell markedly at the same time in the mid-1990s it seems 
likely that a change in offender propensity for crime is more likely to 
provide the main explanation (Home Office 2015). 
Thus we are left with the nagging problem of explaining why there was a 
decrease in nearly all forms of crime from the mid-1990s onwards in a 
number of different countries. This suggests that a broader explanation that 
identifies not only changes in the modes of regulation but also changes in 
the nature of agency, is required. 
 
The second study in the UK has been carried out in the UK has been 
conducted by researchers based in the London School of Economics. 
Significantly, this study focuses on the immigration-crime relation. In a 
series of reports Stephen Machin and his colleagues have examined what 
they see as the two main waves of immigration in the UK (Bell, Machin 
and Fasani 2010; Bell and Machin 2011; Jaitman and Machin 2013). The 
authors suggest that the first wave occurred in the late 1990s and involved 
asylum seekers, while the second wave from 2004 onwards involved 
 17 
woUNHUV IURP GLIIHUHQW (8 FRXQWULHV 'UDZLQJ RQ %HFNHU¶V  
economic theory of crime they conclude that the first wave of asylum 
seekers contributed to an increase in property crime but not violent crime, 
while the second wave of what they refer to as A8 European migrants have 
a negative effect on property crime and no effect on violent crime. They 
also conclude that immigrants have a lower level of victimisation than the 
indigenous population. 
The economic model of crime that they adopt assumes that the fundamental 
driver of criminal involvement is access to the legal labour market. Thus, it 
is suggested that immigrant groups with low employment prospects or who 
find themselves in situations in which the gains from employment are less 
than those for crime will be drawn into crime. Adopting a classic rational 
choice perspective the authors argue that it was the weak labour market 
attachment that propelled the first wave of asylum seekers to engage more 
actively in property crime. However, there are unresolved questions about 
whether the actions of criminals can be adequately explained by the 
FRQFHSW RI µUDWLRQDOLW\¶ *UHHQ DQG 6KDSLUR  1XVVEDXP  ,Q
reality, it is widely recognised that offenders are often unable to make 
meaningful cost-benefit analyses about their involvement in crime, while 
as cultural criminologists have pointed out, criminal involvement often 
involves expressive and risk taking dimensions (Katz 1988; Hayward 
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2007). Moreover, in the UK the influx of poorer Asians from countries like 
Pakistan and India in the 1990s did not result in this group having a high 
involvement in crime or having high rates of imprisonment. The economic 
model of crime also does little to explain white collar crime and corporate 
crime or why the rich frequently engage in malpractices such as fraud and 
embezzlement. However, Machin and his colleagues raise some important 
issues in relation to the use and reliability of the available data. In 
particular, they raise the problem of controlling for endogeneity since 
migrants tend to settle in areas that already have high crime rates. This, in 
turn, raises questions about causality and the neighbourhood effects on 
crime. 
Having considered these contributions to the immigration-crime debate in 
the UK we turn to our own explorative investigation on the relationship 
between immigration and the crime drop. We begin from the observation 
that there is an inverse relationship between the decrease in recorded crime 
and the increase in immigration in England and Wales during the period of 
1990-2010. The question that Figure 1 below raises is whether this 
relationship is significant or coincidental. We note that there are variations 
between decrease in recorded crime levels and the Crime Survey of 
England and Wales. However, these two measures capture different aspects 
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of crime and victimisation, but both indicate a significant downward trend 
in recent years. 
Figure 1. Changing Levels of Crime and Immigration in England and 
Wales 1990-2010, Indexed to 100. 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
The objective of our study is to examine the relation between immigration 
and crime and the possible significance of the thesis that large waves of 
immigration are likely WRKDYHDQHIIHFWRQWKHµFULPRJHQLFFXOWXUH¶RIWKH
receiving country. Drawing on the available UK data we present four 
µVQDSVKRWV¶ GHVLJQHG WR LGHQWLI\ GLIIHUHQW DVSHFWV RI WKH LPPLJUDQW-crime 
relationship. The first two aspects of this issue that we examine include an 
investigation of the macro relation between crime and immigration by area 

























































second set of snapshots focuses on anti-social behaviour in different areas 
and  arrest data for Greater London in 2011.  
Our research draws predominantly on two data sources. First, it extracts 
census data for 2001 and 2011 which features population numbers based on 
country of birth, deemed to be the most appropriate classification since it 
allowed the identification of first generation immigrants. Second, crime data was 
taken from the Notifiable Offences recorded by the police in 2001 and 2011 
(Home Office, 2001/2011). As noted above, these forms of police generated 
data have to be treated with some caution. However, the largest victimisation 
dataset in England and Wales, the Crime Survey for England and Wales only 
includes low level geographical variables since 2008. This data would therefore 
severely restrict the range and relevance of the analysis. Areas examined in 
this analysis are all the cities across England and Wales. 
Table 1 depicts changes between 2001 and 2011 in both immigrant population 
and crime, and also immigrant population in 2001. It therefore addresses the 
following questions 
1. What doHV DQ DUHD¶V LPPLJUDQW SRSXODWLRQ LQ  VD\ DERXW LWV OLNHO\
change in crime per head a decade hence? 
2. How are changes in immigrant populations in different areas between 
2001 and 2011 associated with changes in crime over the same period? 
3. Expressed as a policy question, what can we expect by way of crime 
changes in areas with increased immigrant populations in the future 
behaves like the past. 
Table 1. Area Immigrant Population (Percentage and Count) in 2001 and 
Change in Immigrant Population 2001-2011: Associations with Area Crime 




















































Immigrant Pearsons R -.307* -.327* -.295*   -.421**   
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Count 2001 CoD .094 .107 .087   .177   




Pearsons R     -.366*  -.360* -.348* 
CoD     .134  .130 .121 




Pearsons R      -.342*   
CoD      .117   





Pearsons R         
CoD         
Beta         
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
In each cell of Table 1 there are three numbers. The first is the Pearson product 
moment correlation coefficient; the second is the coefficient of determination, 
namely the proportion of variation in 2011 crime accounted for by the 
immigration variable in question the third is the beta weight, That is, the change 
in recorded crime one might anticipate from the additional of one first 
generation immigrant or 1 per cent change in immigrant population according to 
row of data). It should be noted that the relationship is treated as linear such 
that the effect of the extra immigrant does not differ according to the extant 
number of immigrants. This linearity of course only holds within the range of the 
data captured and may differ for values outside that range.  
In text form, the statistically reliable results are as follows.  
1. For every additional first generation immigrant in an area in 2001, there 
will on average be 0.065 fewer crimes in 2011. The relationship is 
reliable separately for violent and property crimes.  
2. For every additional 1% of first generation immigrants in an area in 2001, 
there will on average be 0.72% fewer crimes per person in 2011. The 
relationship holds for property and vehicle crime but not for violent crime.  
3. There is no case where immigrant population in 2001 or its increase over 
the next decade, is reliably associated with adverse crime changes.  
As has been noted, there are likely to be significant differences in officially 
recorded criminal involvement amongst different immigrant groups. In order to 
explore some of these differences we examined the association between 
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different immigrant groups and crimes for which they are held accountable. 
Immigration and Recorded Crime variables, as in the previous analysis, were 
coded in prevalence change ratios, this time for 344 local authorities across 
England and Wales for the years between 2001 and 2011.  
In order to further the discussion and to encapsulate the various associations 
between different immigrant groups and crime types a number of more specific 
sub-groups were created. 7KHVHLQFOXGHµ6RXWK$VLDQ¶LPPLJUDQWVODUJHO\IURP
India and 3DNLVWDQ µ)DU(DVWHUQ¶ LPPLJUDQWV IURP &KLQD +RQJ .RQJ -DSDQ
0DOD\VLDDQG6LQJDSRUH µ0LGGOH(DVWHUQ¶JURXSVZKR ODUJHO\ FRPH IURP ,UDQ
DQG &\SUXV µ:HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ¶ LQYROYHV D FRPELQDWLRQ of French, German, 
,WDOLDQ DQG 6SDQLVK LPPLJUDQWV µ2WKHU (XURSHDQ¶ FDWHJRU\ ZDV FUHDWHG E\
deducting western immigration from the total European cohort. Majority of 
µ2WKHU(XURSHDQ¶ LPPLJUDQWVFRPH IURP(astern Europe, Scandinavia as well 
as southern Europe. By including these new immigration sub-groups in the 
analysis the intention was to examine a wider spectrum of immigrant groups 
that have settled in England and Wales and their relationship with crime. Violent 
crime includes common assaults, robberies, wounding and sexual offences. 
Property crime category includes theft, criminal damage, arson, burglary and 
YHKLFOH FULPH 3HDUVRQV¶ FRUUHODWLRQs were carried out and are presented in 
Table 2. Significant correlations are highlighted. 
Table 2. Relationships Between the Change in Different Immigration Sub-























Immigration .022 -.167** .026 -.289** -.373** -.068 .049 -.011 .048 .031 
South Asian .079 -.058 .081 -.143** -.099 -.095 .089 .065 .090 .076 
Far Eastern -.050 .179** -.055 .242** .224** .010 -.050 -.060 -.071 -.049 
Middle 
Eastern .033 -.008 .032 .006 -.092 .031 .027 .027 .033 .026 
African .092 -.020 .092 -.113* -.100 -.026 .106* .071 .099 .087 
Other 
European -.708** -.104 -.704** -.105 .027 .647** -.785** -.654** -.602** -.786** 
Western 
European -.200** -.264** -.191** -.359** -.572** -.088 -.136* -.256** -.113* -.177* 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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The first point of interest is that common assault and robbery rates as well as 
violent crime in general appear to be negatively associated with immigration 
flow. Therefore, areas with high new immigrant populations appear to 
experience a greater decrease in violent crimes than areas with lower levels of 
recent immigration. In line with the findings of Jaitman and Machin (2013) we 
found that European immigration, in particular, has an inverse relationship with 
the majority of crime types. The associations do vary and immigration is linked 
to an increase in recorded crime in five cases, but this increase is relatively 
small. Overall, Table 1 shows that there is a statistical association between 
immigration and decreases in violent crime, particularly common assaults and 
robberies. Although there is also an inverse relation with property crime, this 
relationship is not so strong.  
Overall, there is a clear negative association between immigrant influx and the 
change in crime rates for the decade between 2001 and 2011. On a macro 
level, immigrant totals in 2001 as well as immigrant influx between 2001 and 
2011 are both associated with a decrease in recorded crime. On a micro level, 
the influx of immigrants from all backgrounds correlates with a decrease in most 
crime types.  
To examine how immigration has affected low level disorder, UK Census data 
as well as recorded Anti-Social Behaviour data from the police for year 2011 
were sourced for every Middle Layer Super Output Area in England and Wales. 
MLSOAs are commonly used by the Office for National Statistics when 
publishing small area statistics. There are currently 7201 MLSOAs in England 
and Wales, each with a minimum occupancy of 5,000 residents and 2,000 
households (and average occupancy of 7500). It should be noted that while 
anti-social behaviour and disorder are generally seeQDVLQYROYLQJIRUPVRIµSUH-
FULPH¶ WKDW WKHFDWHJRULHVRI$6%WHQGWRPRUSK LQWRYDULRXV W\SHVRIFULPH LQ
certain cases (Matthews 1992).  
The UK Census data are not sufficient to examine immigration from every 
country. For this reason, immigration was divided into a number of detailed 
categories. µOther Africa¶ includes all African countries apart from Ghana, 
Kenya, Somalia, Nigeria and Zimbabwe. µOther EuropeDQ¶ includes all 
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European countries apart from Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Western 
Europe. µWestern Europe¶ includes France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. 
µOther South Asia¶ includes all South Asian countries apart from India and 
Pakistan. µOther Far East¶ includes all Far Eastern countries apart from China. 
µOther Middle-East¶ includes all Middle-Eastern countries apart from Iran. 
MLSOAs were ranked from lowest to highest by every immigration type. The 
average rate of ASB was calculated for top 10 per cent of areas with highest 
proportion of every inhabitant group. So, 720 areas with the highest proportion 
of every population form every column of the figure. The same areas can be in 
the top 10% for more than one population group. The average ASB rate per 
person in England and Wales was indexed to 100. The findings are displayed in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2. ASB rates within areas with predominant immigrant type and 
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A number of points can be gleaned from this figure. First, areas with the highest 
proportion of British nationals suffer from a greater-than-average rate of ASB by 
roughly 13 per cent. Only areas with the greatest proportions of immigrants 
from Poland, Zimbabwe, China and Middle East are associated with higher 
ASB rates than areas with the indigenous population. Second, not only are the 
majority of areas with high immigrant proportions associated with lower ASB 
rates than the indigenous population, but also in areas with high immigrant 
populations ASB rates are mostly found to be significantly below the average 
for England and Wales. 
Our final investigation of the immigration-crime relationship involves an 
exploration of the arrest rates of various immigrant groups in the Greater 
London area. This arrest data was supplied by the Metropolitan Police Service 
(MPS) following a freedom of information request. Immigrant numbers were 
sourced from a corresponding UK Population Census for 32 London Boroughs 
that fall under the responsibility of MPS. Due to the limitations of UK Census, as 
outlined previously, only 27 immigrant sub-groups could be distinguished. 
Figure 3 below depicts arrest rates by country of birth. The average arrest rate 
in London in 2011 was 3.3 per cent of relevant sub-population, indexed to 100. 
For an overwhelming majority of immigrant sub-groups arrest rates were found 
to be significantly below the average. Low arrest rates were associated with 
immigrants from a variety of cultures and continents, suggesting relatively low 
criminality regardless of country of origin. Very few immigrant sub groups were 
found to be arrested more than average, except for Romanians and 
Lithuanians. However, as Laura Jaitman and Stephen Machin (2013) have 
pointed out that there are important demographic differences between 
immigrant groups and the indigenous population particularly with respect to 
age. It is, in the main, younger people who migrate between countries and this 
population tends to be made up, for the most part by young males who are 
statistically speaking the most likely group to become involved in criminal 
activity. It is also the case that that the use of stop and search powers is 
skewed towards males in the 21-40 age group and towards certain ethnic 
minority groups (Bowling and Phillips 2007). However, being arrested is not 
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proof of culpability and it is estimated that approximately 40 per cent of those 
arrested result in the individual facing actual charges (Ministry of Justice 2012). 
Since over a million immigrants were not included in the 27 categories explored 
KHUH WKH DUUHVW UDWH RI µRWKHU LPPLJUDQWV¶ ZDV FDOFXODWHG LQ RUGHU WR WU\ WR
compensate for the shortcomings of datasets and to ensure the inclusion of all 
immigrants in the analysis. Due to the low arrest rates associated with the 
majority of individual immigrant sub-groups as well as the aggregate category 
RI µRWKHU¶WKHFRQFOXVLRQWREHGUDZQLVWhat immigrants in the London area at 
least have a lower arrest rate than the indigenous population, with very few 
notable exceptions. 
 
Figure 3. Arrest Rates in London by Country of Birth, 2011. 
 
Source: Metropolitan Police Service 
To summarize, it appears that in terms of anti-social behaviour and arrest data 
seems to confirm the picture presented in Tables 1 and 2. Above. For most 
immigrant groups, particularly first generation, there appears to be a lower level 
of involvement in most crime types and in areas of high immigrant population 








































































































































These trends, it should be emphasised, are suggestive rather than 
conclusive in terms of the effects that immigration might have on crime. 
While the limited evidence presented in this paper suggests that recent 
waves of immigration have not resulted in an increase in recorded crime, 
but rather may have contributed to the crime drop there are some variations 
between areas and different immigrant groups. In order to explore this 
relation in more detail it would be necessary to engage in an analysis of the 
relation between neighbourhood structure the rate of immigration and the 
changing levels of recorded crime. Such an analysis would need to 
consider the role of other variables such as employment levels, housing, 
cultural variations between different ethnic groups, levels of social 
integration and the like.  
7KHFRUUHODWLRQVWKDWZHKDYHIRXQGKRZHYHUµVLJQLILFDQW¶WKH\PLJKWEHDW
the statistical level do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. Our 
research remains suggestive and speculative. In order to produce a more 
persuasive causal explanation of these developments there is a need to 
theorise these processes more thoroughly and formulate some testable 
hypotheses (Sayer 2010; Pawson and Tilley 1997). It is not just a matter of 
listing variables but of trying to explain the relationship between them and 
how they might be connected. The question is how and why does 
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immigration impact on crime and what are the intervening mechanisms that 
might account for this phenomenon. 
However, tKH LPSUHVVLRQ WKDW HPHUJHV IURP WKH IRXU µVQDSVKRWV¶ WKDW ZH
have presented is that immigration has not been found to be generally 
associated with increasing crime, and as Robert Sampson (2008) has 
suggested immigration could be an important contributory factor in the 
crime drop at least in certain areas and amongst different ethnic groups.  
This is important since as he points out, patterns of immigration are 
currently reshaping the social demographics of the western world. 
Although it has been suggested that immigration may go some way to 
meeting the conditions for developing any credible and comprehensive 
explanation of the crime drop, it should be emphasised that any future 
investigation will need not only to develop testable hypotheses but to 
combine qualitative and quantitative - intensive and extensive - forms of 
analyses that are able to examine the diverse effects of different forms of 
immigration, as well as the impact of different generations of immigrant 
groups over time (Graif and Sampson 2009; Kubrin 2012). This will 
require undertaking not only cross sectional but also longitudinal analysis 
that can locate these changes within the socio-economic context in which 
they occur. In this way the aim is to move from observations and 
descriptions to explanations. This will require a series of detailed 
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qualitative studies that are better equipped to uncover the motivations and 
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